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I 
President Harry S. Truman was one of the most 
influential figures of the Twentieth Century because his 
decisions within a few years of becoming president 
following Franklin D. Roosevelt directly impacted future 
events, such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  Truman’s 
decision to drop the atomic bomb rather than exploring 
other alternatives such as conditional surrender of Japan, 
and his containment policy towards the Soviet Union, were 
due to his personal paranoia of communist expansionism 
throughout the world.  Some scholars try to suggest that 
Truman’s decisions were not major factors in the creation 
of the Cold War, and that he had no other alternatives.  
Truman however, did have other possible alternatives to 
encourage or force Japanese surrender and for dealing with 
the Soviet Union following the War.  He, nonetheless, 
continued to ignore opportunities for cooperation with the 
other Super Power, and his actions were largely responsible 
for pushing the countries into the Cold War. 
 Following the war, liberal explanations of Truman’s 
decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan focused on 
Truman’s intent in saving millions of American lives that 
otherwise would have been lost in a land invasion.  
Revisionist historians such as Gar Alperovitz, from the mid 
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1960’s to 1970’s criticized liberal explanations and 
attacked Truman’s decision to drop the bomb.  Revisionists 
suggested that his decision had less to do with trying to 
avoid war but more to do with using the bomb to influence 
Soviet diplomacy.1
 In 1992, David McCullough joined other Truman 
revivalists defending Truman against these attacks from the 
revisionists.  The revivalist response began around the 
time of Truman’s death in the early 1970s, and then became 
dominant once again after the end of the cold war during 
the late 1980s.  Historians like McCullough argued Truman’s 
policies were positive contributors, and cited the fall of 
the Soviet Union as evidence of that.  These 
interpretations were dominant in the late 1990s and 2000s 
as studies of the factors leading to Truman’s decisions at 
the end of the war.  In his book, “Truman”, McCullough 
defended the traditional, liberal interpretation and argued 
that Truman’s motives had nothing to do with using the bomb 
for leverage against the U.S.S.R. in negotiations, but were 
purely to save American lives and that he had no other 
options.  He asked how Truman would have justified not 
 
                                               
1 Gar Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess,” Foreign Policy 99 (1995). 
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using the bomb to the American people after they had lost 
lives in an invasion.2
 In response to historians such as McCullough, Gar 
Alperovitz wrote, “Hiroshima: Historians Reassess,” in 
1995.  Alperovitz argued that the use of the bomb was not 
necessary to end the war with Japan without an invasion.  
He mentioned that there were alternatives that could have 
been used in order to accomplish conditional surrender, and 
Truman and his advisors were aware of these options.  
However, Truman insisted on unconditional surrender of 
Japan and, according to Alperovitz, Truman felt the bomb 
would end the war before the Soviet Union could enter; 
therefore, he could use it and the shock of the weapon’s 
power as a tool in trying to control Soviet actions.
 
3
 Ronald Takaki’s, “Hiroshima” appeared in the same 
year, which was also the year of the 50th anniversary of the 
first use of the atomic bomb.  Takaki supported 
Alperovitz’s argument that the decision to drop the bomb 
had less to do with Japanese surrender and more to do with 
postwar concerns with Russia.  He argued that Truman did it 
to try and control the future of governing in the Far East 
region and that he also used it as a tool of diplomacy to 
   
                                               
2   David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
3 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima: Historians Reassess.”  
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get his way with policy in Eastern Europe.  Takaki 
discredits the liberal argument that Truman used the bomb 
to save half a million American lives, and he also points 
to racism towards the Japanese people as a leading factor 
in Truman’s decision to bomb Hiroshima.4
 
 
II 
 In early 1944, Truman was merely a Senator from 
Missouri who had no plans to become the vice-presidential 
candidate with Roosevelt’s 1944 re-election campaign.  
Henry A. Wallace, Roosevelt’s Vice-President at that time, 
was well liked by the President, and many assumed that he 
would remain as Vice-President.  However, in the spring of 
1944, leading Democratic Party leaders told Roosevelt that 
Wallace made his ticket weak and with him, the party might 
not win the upcoming Presidential election.  Edward Flynn 
of the Bronx in New York was one of these prominent party 
leaders known as the big city bosses.  He was a good friend 
of Roosevelt with a lot of influence over the President.5  
Flynn and the other big city bosses viewed Wallace as too 
liberal and wanted to get rid of him.6
                                               
4 Ronald T. Takaki, Hiroshima:  Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb (Boston:  Little, 
Brown and Company, 1995).  
  He was also 
5 David McCullough,   “’I Hardly Know Truman’,”  American Heritage 43, no. 4 (1992):  48. 
6 Robert A. Divine,  Foreign Policy and U.S.  Presidential Elections, 1940-1948, (New 
York:  New Viewpoints, 1974), 119. 
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considered “soft” on Communism, and in his diary on July 5th 
1944, Wallace mentioned how the President told him, “many 
people looked on me as a communist or worse.”7
 When Wallace was dismissed as a candidate for re-
election, Truman emerged as one of many who were considered 
to replace him on the ticket.  Truman at first had no 
intentions of becoming Vice-President and he often told 
people that he wasn’t interested in being nominated.
 
8  In a 
letter to his daughter he wrote, “It is funny how some 
people would give a fortune to be as close as I am to it 
and I don’t want it.”9  While Truman was meeting with the 
commissioner of internal revenue, Robert Hannegan, at the 
Blackstone hotel in Chicago just prior to the Democratic 
Convention, Truman overheard Hannegan’s phone conversation 
with the President Roosevelt. In this phone conversation, 
Roosevelt urged Hannegan to ask Truman if he was willing to 
sacrifice the party’s chances at winning the election 
because he didn’t want to be Vice-President.  Immediately 
afterwards Truman finally agreed to run for the 
nomination.10
                                               
7 Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision:  The Diary of Henry A. Wallace 1942-1946,  
(Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 363. 
 
8 McCullough, “’I Hardly Know Truman’,” 50. 
9 McCullough, “’I Hardly Know Truman’,” 50. 
10 McCullough, “’I Hardly Know Truman’,” 60. 
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 Truman’s supporters, who urged Roosevelt to pick him 
as his running mate for the upcoming election, were big 
city bosses who opposed Wallace’s re-nomination.  These men 
knew that whoever became the next Vice-President would most 
likely be the next President because they didn’t expect 
Roosevelt would survive a fourth term.11  Flynn and the 
other big city bosses liked Truman as a favorable candidate 
because they viewed him as a professional politician who 
could be easily manipulated.12  Truman throughout his time 
in the Senate always voted in favor of Roosevelt’s New Deal 
policies.  In his memoirs Truman wrote, “I was a New Dealer 
from the start.”13  The vast expenditures from the New Deal 
went to these big city bosses and gave them even greater 
power.14  Truman was well aware of those who backed him.  He 
mentioned that when meeting with Hannegan at the Blackstone 
Hotel, that all of the political bosses, Ed Pauley, Frank 
Walker, Ed Kelly, Flynn, and Rank Hague, were there trying 
to convince him to run for the vice-presidency.15
                                               
11 McCullough,   “’I Hardly Know Truman’,” 48. 
  Since 
Truman would replace a man they considered too liberal and 
soft on Communism, he perceived himself as being placed in 
the office because he was the opposite.  He was a 
12 Divine, 120. 
13 Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, Vol. 1 of Memoirs. (Garden City, New York:  
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955) 149. 
14 McCullough, Truman, 224.  
15 Merle Miller, Plain Speaking:  An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman, (New York:  
Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1974), 181. 
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politician who supported big business and someone who was 
against the principles of Communism.      
 Prior to Truman’s nomination to the vice-presidency, 
he was elected U.S. Senator from Missouri as the result of 
the influence of a big city boss.  The Prominent political 
boss in Missouri was Tom Pendergast from Kansas City.  
Pendergast’s power was as great as any political boss in 
the country, and his vote influenced all elections in 
Missouri, because his organization provided most of the 
jobs.16  Truman realized that he could not advance in 
politics without the blessing of Pendergast.  Truman even 
stated that things would be fine as “long as the Big Boss 
believes in me…”17
When Truman won the election for the Senate in 1936, 
the local press argued that Truman had little to do with 
his victory, but rather Pendergast was the actual reason.  
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch wrote, “Under our political 
system, an obscure man can be made the nominee of a major 
political party for the high office of United States 
Senator by virtue of the support given him by a city boss.  
County judge Truman is nominee because Tom Pendergast 
  
                                               
16 McCullough, Truman, 195-196. 
17 McCullough, Truman, 195. 
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willed it so.”18  Once Truman was in the Senate, his ties 
and loyalty remained with Pendergast and his Kansas City 
organization.  In the reception area of his office, Truman 
hung a portrait of Pendergast.19
 During Truman’s eight years in the Senate from 1936-
1944, there were increasingly greater conflicts between 
labor organizations and the industrial bosses.  During the 
1930s, the two labor organizations, the American Federation 
of Labor (A.F.L.) and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(C.I.O.) began to fight over influence and control in 
labor.  The conflicts between the A.F.L. and C.I.O. caused 
strikes to break out in every industry during 1937 and 
1938.  As one result, anti-labor sentiment began to grow in 
the pre-war United States.
 
20  In 1941, the labor unions 
controlled by these organizations demanded higher wages, 
but industrial employers refused to recognize these unions 
or their demands.  As a result, 4,300 strikes broke out 
throughout the country in 1941.21
                                               
18 Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency, (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 
1973), 76. 
  Since these strikes 
harmed the country’s national defense program, the public 
accused these communist inspired labor unions as putting 
19 McCullough, Truman, 216. 
20 Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor, (New York:  The Macmillan Company, 
1959), 364-365. 
21 Rayback, 371. 
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their own desires above the country’s well being.22  They 
connected these labor unions with communism because many of 
the leaders in the C.I.O. in charge of these industrial 
unions were communist.23
 Truman, whose loyalties and ties were with industrial 
bosses like Pendergast, supported anti-union during his 
years in the Senate.  As chairman of the Senate Committee 
to Investigate the National Defense Program, Truman blamed 
labor unions for the inefficiency of the national defense 
program.
 
24  In a letter to his wife, Bess, on August 21, 
1941, Truman wrote, “Labor is a problem.  The same brand of 
racketeer is getting his hand in as did in the camp 
construction program.  Some of ‘em should be in jail.”25
Truman opposed labor’s use of sit down strikes and in 
1937 supported a measure that condemned the use of the 
tactic.
   
26
                                               
22 Rayback, 373. 
  During 1941, when news was reported that Germany 
had turned its attack against the Soviet Union, (then 
Senator) Truman stated, “If we see that Germany is winning 
we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we out to 
help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as 
possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious 
23 Rayback, 366-367. 
24 Cochran, 108. 
25 McCullough, Truman, 264. 
26 Truman, 153. 
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under any circumstances.”27
 
  During Truman’s years in the 
Senate from 1936-1944, he had already began to view 
communism as a menace that needed to be dealt with. 
III 
One of the main consequences of Truman’s effort to 
prepare for an ideological war against Communism was his 
decision to use the atomic bomb.  President Truman claimed 
that his decision to drop the bomb was influenced strictly 
by trying to accomplish Japanese surrender quickly without 
the loss of many American lives.  In reality, though, his 
motives were not purely saving peoples lives, but were 
affected by his fear of Russian expansion following the war 
and also his hatred of Japanese and his wanting to take 
revenge for Pearl Harbor.  Truman mentioned in his memoirs 
that following the Potsdam Conference he realized what he 
must do in shaping future foreign policy.  He wrote, “Force 
is the only thing the Russians understand.  And while I was 
hopeful that Russia might someday be persuaded to work in 
co-operation for peace, I knew that the Russians should not 
be allowed to get into any control of Japan.”28
                                               
27 McCullough, Truman, 262. 
   Truman had 
many other alternatives that would have provided the 
28 Truman, 412. 
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Japanese surrender without invasion.  These included 
allowing a conditional surrender with the Emperor intact or 
he could wait for the Soviet entry into the war, but he 
wanted to use the atomic bomb to help out with Russian 
diplomacy.29
 In the morning of Tuesday August 7, 1945, the New York 
Times reported the atomic bomb had been dropped on the 
Japanese city of Hiroshima.  According to the Times, Truman 
blamed the Japanese government for forcing the United 
States to use the bomb.  The article quoted Truman, who 
said that the Japanese were unwilling to accept the demands 
of surrender from the Potsdam conference and that if they 
did not accept, they could expect “a rain of ruin from the 
air the like of which has never been seen on this earth.”
 
30  
Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated in the article that 
the Japanese people would rather die than surrender and it 
was a relief to have a bomb that could be used against this 
type of enemy.  He claimed that the bomb helped shorten the 
war.  In reference to dropping the bomb on Hiroshima in 
Japan, Truman reportedly said, “What has been done, is the 
greatest achievement of organized science in history.”31
                                               
29 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess”, 33. 
 
30 Sidney Shalett, “New Age Ushered,” New York Times, 7 August 1945, 1. 
31 Shalett, 2. 
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 Truman rationalized his decision to use the bomb as 
trying to save American lives.  He later said that if the 
U.S. was forced to invade Japan, then a half a million 
soldiers would have been killed and a million more would 
have been injured for life.32  This suggests that Truman 
believed that without the bomb, the U.S. would have had to 
invade Japan in order to force its surrender and that would 
have resulted in great casualties.  In relation to his 
decision, Truman said “When you have to deal with a beast 
you have to treat him as a beast.”33  Truman also made sure 
that he was the one who was in charge of the final 
decision.  He never relinquished responsibility and he 
actually wrote in his memoirs, “The final decision of where 
and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.  Let there be 
no mistake about it.  I regarded the bomb as a military 
weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.”34
 In reality, though, there was a good chance that the 
Japanese would have surrendered even without the United 
States bombing of Hiroshima, or a U.S. invasion, and Truman 
knew this was possible.  Japan faced shortages on 
everything from their ammunition to fuel, which made their 
military position very weak and would soon have forced 
 
                                               
32 Miller, 227. 
33 Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crises:  The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948, 
(New York:  Norton, 1977), 97. 
34 Truman, 419. 
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their surrender.35  Many high-ranking officers such as 
General MacArthur and Eisenhower knew this and disagreed 
with Truman on using the bomb, saying it was not necessary.  
In the South Pacific, on the same day the bomb was dropped 
on Hiroshima, General MacArthur gave a press conference on 
the situation with the Japanese.  In that press conference, 
MacArthur mentioned that the war might be over sooner than 
most expected and that Japan was already beaten.  He stated 
that their Navy was impotent and that their shipping had 
been destroyed.  Following that press conference, he 
received news of the bomb being dropped on Hiroshima.36
General Eisenhower supported MacArthur’s stance and 
told Secretary Stimson at the Potsdam Conference, that the 
atomic bomb should not be used because the Japanese had 
already been defeated.
   
37
                                               
35 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess”, 17-18. 
  John Galbraith, who was a member 
of a U.S. strategic bombing survey group that looked at the 
necessity and effects of bombing tactics, studied the 
effect the atomic bomb had on ending the war in Japan 
shortly after the war.  He concluded that the bomb only 
made a difference of two-to-three weeks in advancing the 
surrender of Japan.  He claims the decision to seek peace 
had already been made prior to the Hiroshima bombing and 
36 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 31. 
37 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 30. 
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that it took time for the heavily bureaucratic Japanese 
government to accomplish this.  In his oral history 
interview with Studs Terkel, he states, “There would have 
been negotiations for surrender within days or a few weeks 
under any circumstances.  Before the A-bombs were dropped, 
Japan was a defeated nation.”38
 Truman claimed an invasion would cost half a million 
American lives, but he knew that the casualties of an 
invasion would be much lighter.  At Okinawa, American 
forces suffered tremendously large numbers of deaths due to 
Japanese unwillingness to surrender, and Truman was at 
first afraid that this would also happen with a mainland 
invasion, but to a higher degree.  In a June 18th meeting, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured Truman that an invasion 
of the Japanese homeland would not be another Okinawa 
because the beaches near the Tokyo Plain were more suitable 
for invasion.  The reason was that on Okinawa, there was 
only one direction the invasion could come from and that 
spot was heavily fortified, but on Kyushu they could attack 
from three fronts.  Also, the beaches were more suitable 
because they were not as steep and the terrain of the Tokyo 
 
                                               
38 John Galbraith in Studs Terkel, The Good War, (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1984), 210. 
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plain would allow them to use their maneuver abilities 
better.39
When General Marshal, in June, sent a message to 
General MacArthur on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
asking him whether or not he still estimated casualties for 
an invasion at around 50,800 deaths, MacArthur assured them 
that he didn’t anticipate the numbers to be so high.  He 
claimed, instead that battle deaths would be no greater 
than 31,000.
   
40
 Truman and his advisors were also quite aware of the 
Japanese efforts to seek peace.  After the tragic results 
on Okinawa for the Japanese, where 109,629 people died 
during the U.S. invasion,
  Truman and his advisors were well aware that 
the numbers of death they stated to rationalize their use 
of the atomic bomb were exaggerated. 
41
                                               
39 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 24. 
 Emperor Hirohito was anxious to 
find a way to bring the war to an end.  He sent offers to 
Moscow seeking Soviet help in negotiating peace.  Stalin 
announced during a meeting at Potsdam that the Japanese 
were asking Soviet help in mediating peace to end the war.  
Truman wrote, “It now appeared that the Japanese had sent 
another message, advising the Soviet government that Prince 
40 Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (New Jersey:  Princeton 
University Press, 1966), 8-9. 
41 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, “World War II,” n.d., 
<http://search.eb.com/ebi/article?eu=299985> (24 May 2003). 
 17 
Konoye would request Russian mediation and that he was 
acting on behalf of the Emperor, who wanted to prevent 
further bloodshed in the war.”42
Japan’s primary concern was the desire for a guarantee 
there would be no abolition of the Emperor system in 
Japan’s government upon surrender.
   
43  Truman knew the 
Japanese were seeking peace because the U.S. had broken the 
Japanese codes and were able to acquire direct information 
on Japanese actions and communications.44
 
  With this 
knowledge, Truman and his advisors knew they had multiple 
options in how to end the war without invading Japan.   
IV 
One possible option was combined assault.  The 
Japanese military was in poor shape and the people also 
lacked essentials for survival.  The theory behind the 
method of combined assault was to beat up the Japanese 
until they could no longer fight.  This would be done 
through continuous air attacks and a naval blockade of the 
country.  Admiral William Leahy, the personal chief of 
staff to the President, favored this option and believed 
                                               
42 Truman, 396. 
43 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 33. 
44 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess”, 18. 
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that with this combined assault the Japanese could be 
forced to surrender.45
 Another option was by inducement.  The main obstacle 
to Japanese surrender was the Japanese fear that the 
Emperor would be abolished.  Many United States officials, 
including Secretary of State Joseph Grew, believed that 
surrender could be accomplished by allowing the Japanese to 
retain their Emperor.  The Japanese would not surrender if 
they knew that the Emperor would be abolished because they 
viewed him as a deity.
 
46  The elites’ privileged position 
also relied on the continuance of the Emperor and his 
dynasty, and they were unwilling to accept surrender with 
the abolishment of the Emperor.47
Men like Grew knew that Japan would not accept 
surrender with the abolishment of the Emperor included and 
tried to convince the President to issue a proclamation for 
surrender with the assurance that the Emperor would remain.  
In his memoirs, Truman recalled, “Acting Secretary of State 
Grew had spoken to me in late May about issuing a 
proclamation that would urge the Japanese to surrender but 
would assure them that we would permit the Emperor to 
   
                                               
45 Feis, 5. 
46 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess”, 19. 
47  Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty (New York: Broadway Books, 
1999), 194. 
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remain as head of the state.”48  Admiral Leahy said on June 
18, 1945 that this would be consistent with the 1941 
Atlantic Charter promise which created a new global 
organization to help manage international affairs, issued 
by the U.S. and England, guaranteeing the right of people 
to choose their own government.49
 Many officials, including General Marshall, also 
believed that the Soviet Union’s entry into war with Japan 
would dishearten the Japanese and encourage them to 
surrender.
 
50  Joseph Stalin, at the February 1945 Yalta 
Conference, promised he would join the war with Japan no 
later than three months following the German surrender.  
This placed the approximate time for Soviet entry into the 
war around August 8th, and at Potsdam, Stalin confirmed the 
Soviets would follow through with this commitment.51  
General Marshal and many military leaders believed that the 
attack on Japan by the U.S.S.R. would bring about Japanese 
surrender.52
 In addition to the possible assurances that the 
Emperor could remain and the likely effect that Soviet 
entry into the war would have on Japanese die-hards, Truman 
 
                                               
48 Truman, 416. 
49 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 32. 
50 Feis, 14. 
51 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess”, 21. 
52 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima:  Historians Reassess”, 20. 
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also could have used the option of demonstrating the use of 
the bomb and possibility of non-military to secure Japanese 
surrender.  The idea of a non-military demonstration was 
rejected on June 1st by Truman’s Interim Committee, which 
was supposed to advise the president on the use of the 
bomb, and its recommendation was based on the fear that 
when demonstrating the bomb, it would turn out to be a dud.  
They argued that if the demonstration failed that the 
chance of shock and surprise would be gone.53
 Truman rejected all of these options.  He didn’t like 
the idea of allowing Soviet entry into the war, because if 
that happened, the U.S.S.R. would gain leverage and 
influence at the peace table, which Truman and his advisors 
didn’t want.
 
54  Truman stated in his memoirs that the 
Soviets were always trying to acquire their own advantage 
and after negotiations over Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Hungary, and Poland, he didn’t want them involved in 
control over Japan, because the Soviets were trying to 
conquer the world.55
                                               
53 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 39-40. 
  He also rejected the idea of providing 
some type of warning, or even a provision in the July 26, 
1945 Potsdam Declaration, allowing the Emperor to stay 
after surrender.  However, after the use of the atomic bomb 
54 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 65. 
55 Truman, 412. 
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and the Japanese surrender, he did allow the Emperor to 
remain.  Prior to that decision, however, Truman didn’t do 
anything to improve possibilities for prompt surrender.56
Japan had just changed their Premier in their 
government due to Premier Kuniaki Koiso’s lack of support 
from militarists or peace groups, and the recent defeats of 
Japan at Leyte and Iwo Jima.
   
57  In response to the Potsdam 
declaration, the new Japanese Premier, Kantara Suzuki, told 
the press that, since the declaration demanded Japan’s 
unconditional surrender but didn’t propose anything new, 
Japan would just ignore it.58  Winston Churchill suggested 
that Truman offer Japan a warning to surrender on terms 
just short of unconditional surrender in order to allow the 
Japanese to save their national identity and military 
honor.  Truman’s response was, “The Japs had no longer any 
military honor after Pearl Harbor.”59
 Truman pushed for quick surrender from Japan by 
shocking them with the atomic bomb.  When Truman made the 
final decision, he followed the three recommendations of 
the interim committee.  The first recommendation was that 
the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.  
 
                                               
56 Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power, Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief, (Baton 
Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 40.  
57 John Toland, The Rising Sun:  The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945, 
(New York:  Random House, 1970), 679-687. 
58 Haynes, 55. 
59 Haynes, 38. 
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The Committee argued this would accomplish a quick end to 
the war without need for assistance from the Soviets.  The 
second recommendation was that the bomb should be used on a 
dual target.  They wanted it to be a military target to 
justify the actions, but they also wanted it to be 
surrounded by houses to accomplish a more psychological 
effect on the people.  The third recommendation was to use 
it without any prior warning to the Japanese to provide the 
initial shock desired.  The committee argued the United 
States had already provided a warning in the form of the 
Potsdam Proclamation, which had indicated that four 
Japanese cities would soon be destroyed from the air.60
 One reason Truman decided to drop the bomb rather than 
follow one of the other alternatives was the great amount 
of money already invested into the project in creating the 
atomic bomb.  Federal expenditures on the bomb totaled over 
$2 billion dollars and congress planned to suspend funding 
if the war ended before the bomb was used.
 
61  This expense 
probably made it impossible, in Truman’s mind, not to use 
the bomb in the end.62
                                               
60 Feis, 47-48. 
  The continuance of federal 
expenditures also benefited the industrial bosses who 
Truman supported and was likely another reason for wanting 
61 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 38-39. 
62 Alperovitz, “Hiroshima: Historians Reassess”, 28. 
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to make sure that federal funding continued on nuclear 
production. 
 Truman’s willingness to use the bomb on Hiroshima also 
had to do with racism and the desire for revenge towards 
the Japanese by America.  People in the United States 
viewed the Japanese as demons, savages, and beasts.63  The 
Europeans were viewed as good people subjected to bad 
leadership, but the Japanese were viewed as bad people and 
Americans wore buttons that read “Jap hunting license.”  In 
a 1945 July edition of Time magazine, the magazine 
declared, “The ordinary unreasoning Jap is ignorant.  
Perhaps he is human.  Nothing … indicates it.”64  Americans 
developed an attitude of no mercy on Japan because they 
believed Japan had no mercy on them.65  In reference to that 
time, E.B. Sledge stated in his oral history interview with 
Terkel, “You developed an attitude of no mercy because they 
had no mercy on us.”66
A survey in a December 1945 issue of Fortune magazine, 
reported that 53.5 percent of Americans polled agreed with 
using the bombs the way Truman did, and 22.7 percent 
thought he should have used as many as he could before they 
   
                                               
63 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 73. 
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could surrender.67   Truman shared this hatred of the 
Japanese race and, like many other Americans; he wanted 
revenge because of his bitterness about Pearl Harbor.68
In his diary, Truman referred to Japanese as savages, 
and in reference to Hiroshima he said, “Japanese began the 
war from the air at Pearl Harbor.  They have been repaid 
manifold.”
   
69
 
  This reveals that Truman had no compassion for 
the Japanese people and revenge was on his mind when making 
the decision to use the atomic bomb. 
V 
 The most important factor in Truman’s decision to use 
the atomic bomb was his effort to affect foreign diplomacy 
with the Soviet Union.  Truman was concerned with Russian 
expansionism.  He wrote that after Potsdam his feeling was 
that “The Russians were planning world conquest.”70  
Secretary of State James Byrnes later described Truman’s 
ideas when he began to define the atomic attack on Japan as 
a way to challenge Soviet expansionism.71
                                               
67 Elmo Roper, “The Fortune Survey,” Fortune, December 1945, 305. 
  In his memoirs, 
Truman wrote that he met with Stimson at noon on the 25th of 
April.  He recalled that Stimson, “…wanted specifically to 
68 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 99. 
69 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 100. 
70 Truman, 412. 
71 Takaki, “Hiroshima”, 62. 
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talk to me today about the effect the atomic bomb might 
likely have on our future foreign relations… And he had 
added that in his belief the bomb might well put us in a 
position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war.”72
 Truman and his advisors found it important to use the 
bomb to end the war with Japan before the Soviet Union got 
involved.  Once they were given notice at Potsdam that the 
bomb worked, Truman tried to stall Stalin, delaying Soviet 
entry in the war.  The reasoning was, in Byrnes words, that 
the Administration was “hoping for time, believing [that] 
after [the] atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia 
will not get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a 
position to press claims against China.”
 
73
 Months prior to using the bomb, the way in which 
Truman dealt with Stalin at the Potsdam conference during 
the summer of 1945 provides evidence that the power of the 
atomic bomb would be used to leverage negotiations with the 
Soviet Union over post-war issues.  Truman began to take a 
more aggressive and non-compromising approach in dealing 
with Stalin.  While at Potsdam, Truman received news that 
the tests on the atomic bomb were successful.  Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson observed this new attitude and said in 
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reference to President Truman that it “gave him an entirely 
new feeling of confidence.”74
The two biggest issues at Potsdam that divided 
American and Soviet negotiators involved the amount of 
reparations the Soviet Union would receive from Germany, 
and the location of Poland’s western boundary.
   
75  Soviet 
interests in these two issues were a matter of security.  
Stalin was determined to receive the reparations promised 
to them during the Yalta agreements to help rebuild Soviet 
industry.  These reparations also would ensure that Germany 
wouldn’t ever be able to wage another war on the Soviet 
Union.  The amount that the Soviets demanded was $10 
billion.76
Soviets viewed the Poland boundary issue as vital to 
their security.  Historically, Poland had been the door for 
attack on Russia.  One of Stalin’s top priorities following 
the war was to somehow close that door.
   
77
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  After the war, 
Stalin wanted Poland to occupy parts of German territory 
along its western boundary.  He also pushed to make sure 
that the Polish government was friendly to the Soviet 
Union.  This would buffer the Soviet Union from other 
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countries in Europe.  Truman would not agree to this and 
said he refused to give away Germany in many pieces.78
Stalin tried to compromise and stated the Soviets 
would accept $1-$2 billion less than what the Yalta 
agreements had proposed.  Both Truman and Secretary of 
State James Byrnes refused this offer because both believed 
that the bomb would allow them to achieve their goals 
without having to compromise with Stalin.
   
79  In referring to 
the bomb, Truman wrote on July 18th, “I have several aces in 
the hole.”80
 
  He truly believed he held the upper hand on 
everyone else, including the Soviet Union. 
VI 
 In the 1960s, revisionists attacked Truman and his 
role in starting the Cold War.  Their critiques were based 
on their dissatisfaction with liberal democratic 
capitalism.  Revisionists also did not trust presidential 
powers and disliked the continued growth of the military 
and the buildup of nuclear weapons.  Many also wrote in 
response to the failing campaign of the Vietnam War.81
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1961, argued that Truman shifted the policy of cooperation 
that Roosevelt had established with the Soviet Union and 
was therefore, the main cause of the Cold War.  He 
suggested that the ideological war between the two 
countries was not inevitable, but rather that Truman’s 
uncompromising approach with the Soviet Union pushed Stalin 
towards opposing the United States.82
 In 1967, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. defended Truman in 
“Origins of the Cold War,” challenging the  revisionist 
interpretation.  He claimed that any alternative U.S. 
policy towards the U.S.S.R. would not have made a 
difference.  Rather, he argued, the Cold War was 
inevitable.  He argued that Stalin’s paranoia was 
responsible for the beginning of the Cold War.  Even if 
Truman had compromised with Stalin, Schlesinger argued, 
Stalin thought the world needed to be dominated by 
communist ideology and he eventually would have tried to 
expand Soviet influence throughout the world.  No Truman 
policy, therefore, would have been successful, if it 
required compromise with Stalin.
 
83
 Barton J. Bernstein, in “American Foreign Policy and 
the Origins of the Cold War,”(1970) responded to 
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Schlesinger’s liberal defense of Truman.  He wrote this 
book during the Vietnam War and was most likely influenced 
by what he saw as the failure of American foreign policy.  
Bernstein argued that leaders of the U.S. wanted to reshape 
the world to meet American needs and standards.  Truman’s 
administration, for example, tried to eliminate Soviet 
influence in Eastern Europe, which contradicted Roosevelt’s 
agreement with the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference.  
This “Truman Doctrine” destroyed any chance for 
accommodation between the two countries and directly led to 
the Cold War.  Bernstein argued that the Truman 
administration took this stance in a fearful effort to 
protect American political economy from expansive Soviet 
Communism.84
This policy toward the Soviet Union was a shift from 
the policy that Roosevelt had followed while he was 
president.  Roosevelt adopted a policy of accommodation and 
cooperation when dealing with the Soviets.  He believed 
that the Communist government couldn’t last, that it was 
too unnatural, and that its control would eventually falter 
away.  Therefore, he believed that the U.S. should use the 
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policy of cooperation and eventually both countries would 
come more united as the Communist government failed.85
Roosevelt revealed this accommodating stance when he 
entered into armistice agreements with Britain and Russia 
in early 1945.  In the agreements, he accepted Russian 
military control over the governments of the ex-Nazi 
satellites in Eastern Europe.
 
86
An editorial in the February 26, 1945 issue of Life 
magazine, mentions that Roosevelt had been criticized by 
the United States press and Republican Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg for his policy of abstention in European policy.  
The article regarding Yalta praised Roosevelt for his new 
involvement in European matters.  It also expressed hopes 
that the United States and “Russia” could work together.  
The editor wrote, “Russia, too, has proved again at Yalta 
that, while she may have her own plans for Europe, 
especially on her borders, she would rather promote them 
within the Big Three framework than through a lone-wolf 
imperialism.  Thus America and Russia have edged a little 
closer to each other, like partners in a Virginia reel.”
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 Other high-ranking officials who supported cooperation 
with the Soviet Union were General Marshall and Dwight 
Eisenhower.  Their reasoning was that up to the end of the 
war, Soviet President Joseph Stalin had fulfilled all of 
his military commitments.88  During the war, Americans also 
perceived Stalin in a friendly and popular way.  He was 
nicknamed Uncle Joe, who was tough but friendly to the 
United States.89  Truman at first showed a liking for 
Stalin.  Truman said while at Potsdam, in referring to the 
Soviet President, “I can deal with Stalin.  He is honest—
but smart as hell.”90  This positive outlook towards Stalin 
changed, however, during 1945.  Following the Potsdam 
Conference, Truman claimed that the Soviets were seeking 
their own aims and were tough to bargain with.  He wrote, 
“Yet I was not altogether disillusioned to find now that 
the Russians were not in earnest about peace.”91
 Due to his unwillingness to work with the Soviets, 
Soviet diplomats became frustrated with Truman.  They tried 
to compromise, expressing willingness to accept $8 billion 
rather than the $10 billion in reparations proposed at 
Yalta, but Truman would not give them what they believed 
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was their due for their contribution in the war.92  Soviet 
diplomats felt as though Truman had abandoned Roosevelt’s 
policy of cooperation.  Secretary of State Byrnes suggested 
that this complaint was very understandable, since Truman 
was reversing Roosevelt’s agreements to let Soviets have 
control in Eastern Europe, because he wanted to reduce 
Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.93
 The U.S. questioned Soviet intentions following the 
war.  In 1945, Americans did not view Soviet policy as 
expansionist and were not worried about expansion of 
communism at that time.
 
94  In a New York Times article on 
June 22nd 1945, Admiral William H. Standley observed, “that 
Stalin ‘sincerely and fervently’ wants a lasting peace.”95  
The next day, the New York Times printed another article 
quoting Bernard M. Baruch as saying, “I have no fear of the 
spread of bolshevism in the United States.”96
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   After the 
war, however, Truman and his administration started to 
claim that the Soviets were out to expand their Empire.  
Many Americans began to express fears that the Soviet Union 
was not willing to compromise and wanted to dominate them 
internationally.  They argued that efforts to compromise 
93 Alperovitz, “How Did The Cold War Begin?”, 98. 
94 Alperovitz, “How Did The Cold War Begin?”, 94. 
95 “Russia Seen Eager For Lasting Peace,” New York Time, 22 June 1945, 8. 
96 Frederick R. Barkley, “Baruch Says Peace Depends on Ending Reich’s War Power,” New York 
Time, 23 June 1945, 6. 
 33 
were useless.  Instead, Americans favored a get-tough 
policy with the Soviet Union.97  Truman argued that if the 
United States failed to help the countries in Eastern 
Europe escape Soviet dominance, the Soviets would not be 
satisfied with just having that area.  Rather, they would 
then penetrate into Western Europe and would conquer that 
area next.98
 This claim that Soviet policy was mainly expansionist 
and could not be negotiated with was false.  There was 
really no indication of an interest in world conquest on 
Stalin’s part.  In Adam Ulman’s study of Soviet foreign 
policy, he observed, “Soviet leaders sensibly enough 
concentrated on the area deemed of direct importance to the 
Soviet Union:  eastern and southeastern Europe.”
 
99
Soviet interests following the war aimed at protecting 
their frontiers from future attacks.  The U.S.S.R. had 
suffered many invasions, with the latest one (World War II) 
  This 
suggests that the U.S.S.R. was primarily concerned with 
just the areas in their sphere of influence, like Eastern 
Europe, and not areas that had no impact on their country’s 
interests. 
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costing them the deaths of about twenty million people.100  
Stimson told Truman that Soviet demands for security in 
Eastern Europe were not unreasonable, and were comparable 
to the U.S. position in Latin America.101
This point was proven in 1948, when the United States 
attempted the same type of security control at the Bogotá 
conference.  Historian Rollie E. Poppino observed that in 
response to U.S. concerns about international communism in 
Latin America, “the conference declared international 
communism incompatible with the American concept of freedom 
and called on the member states to control the activities 
of local Communists.”
 
102
Ex-vice president Henry Wallace, who was later 
released from his cabinet position, Secretary of Commerce, 
because of his public criticisms of Truman’s administration 
in dealing with the Soviet Union, argued that Truman should 
have allowed Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.  He wrote 
to Truman in 1946, suggesting that the U.S.S.R. had 
legitimate security needs in Europe.
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these needs included political and economic security from 
Western hostilities.104
 Along with the evidence that suggests Russia was not 
interested in expansion, Soviets also took many actions 
that show they were willing to compromise and cooperate 
with America.  When Truman first took over as President, 
Stalin stated, “President Roosevelt has died but his cause 
must live on.  We shall support President Truman with our 
forces and all our will.”
 
105  Stalin and his government 
allowed free elections in Finland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia.  Stalin and Byrnes also worked out 
agreements to control the atomic bomb, but Truman and 
Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg overturned them in 
December of 1945.106  Between March 20th and 23rd of 1946, the 
Soviets even offered to leave Iran and completely withdraw 
from China by the end of April.107
In response, the U.S. rejected the legitimate 
expression of security interests desired by the Soviets in 
Eastern Europe, and U.S. policy-makers refused to meet the 
Soviets halfway.  Rather, the U.S. demanded that the 
U.S.S.R. should give up all land gained by occupation 
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during the war.108  Stimson argued that conditions in 
Eastern Europe would have turned out differently if the 
U.S. had been willing to negotiate with the Soviets and had 
helped provide for their security requirements to be met.109  
In Hungary for example, the Soviet Union allowed Soviet 
sponsored free elections to occur in 1945.110
 Truman’s administration wanted something that would 
give it a clear picture on Soviet foreign policy and it 
found it in 1946.  Following a speech by Stalin in February 
1946, which Truman perceived as threatening.  Truman asked 
the Charge d’ Affairs of the American embassy in Moscow, 
George Kennan, what he felt Soviet intentions were.
 
111  
Kennan’s long telegram in that year argued against 
negotiating and emphasized containment of the Soviet 
Union.112
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  Kennan, who due to his embassy position in 
Moscow, was considered an expert in relation to Soviet 
government, attacked the Soviet leadership and claimed the 
Soviets were dangerous and committed to destroying the 
United States.  Kennan’s telegram helped Truman’s 
administration develop a picture of the Soviet Union, and 
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his containment suggestion supported the stance already 
taken by the Truman administration.113
 Along with Kennan’s telegram, Truman’s administration 
used the tactic of fear to accomplish their policies and 
objectives in relation to the Soviet Union.  Truman asked 
Republican Senator Vandenberg how he could get his Greek-
Turkish aid bill passed and Vandenberg told him, “There is 
only one way to get it.  That is to make a personal 
appearance before Congress and scare hell out of the 
country.”
 
114
 Truman’s administration began a campaign of comparing 
Stalin and the Russian government to Hitler’s Nazi 
government.  In 1947, Truman said, “There isn’t any 
difference in totalitarian states.  I don’t care what you 
call them, Nazi, Communist or Fascist…”
  That is exactly what Truman and his 
administration attempted to accomplish. 
115
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against aggressive movements that seek to impost on them 
totalitarian regimes.”116
Bliss Lane, American ambassador to Poland, even 
suggested that Soviet security police were the same as 
Germany’s Gestapo.
   
117  The Truman Doctrine asserted that 
totalitarian regimes imposed on free people and threatened 
international peace and U.S. security.  Truman linked 
international peace with U.S. security.118  In reference to 
the civil war between the Greek government and the 
communist rebels, Truman stated that the fall of Greece to 
communists would start a chain reaction that led to them 
dominating the world and is why it is necessary for the 
U.S. to fight against such actions that threaten their 
security.119
The Truman Doctrine, urged all Americans to join a 
moral crusade against the evil of communism and Truman 
described his stand on aid to Greece as a “counter-Russia 
move.”
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endanger the welfare of this nation.”121  Without this scare 
tactic, Truman probably would not have been able to get his 
bill approved to provide military aid to the Greek 
government.  During this time, his power in the government 
dwindled.  The Republicans dominated both houses of 
Congress, and Truman’s approval rate was down to only 32 
percent.122
 Although Truman made this connection between Greece 
and Russia, Stalin and the Soviet government were not 
involved with the communist guerillas who were creating 
problems in Greece for the government through violent 
conflicts.  Stalin provided no aid to Greek communists and 
was actually willing to accept a form of democracy in 
Greece, as long as it was friendly to Russia.
  Using fear enabled Truman, with help from 
leading Republicans like Vandenberg, to regain power in the 
government, and he was then re-elected. 
123  He did so 
in Finland by accepting their moderate government in 1945, 
as long as they kept a foreign policy “friendly to 
Russia.124
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  Stalin actually viewed the communist guerillas 
as a nuisance to him because they just caused problems for 
him.  Along with providing no aid, he also asked 
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Yugoslovakia to stop providing help to the communist 
rebels.125
The Truman Doctrine frustrated the Soviets in their 
attempts to work with America, beginning in 1945 when 
Truman started his aggressive negotiating campaign at the 
Potsdam conference.  His uncompromising approach forced the 
Soviets to tighten their grip on Eastern Europe in order to 
maintain their security interests.  The Truman Doctrine 
escalated the Cold War for the first time, by publicly 
declaring an ideological war on the Soviet Union. 
   
 The Soviet Union was not innocent in the beginning of 
the Cold War, and it played a major part in the starting of 
it, but President Harry S. Truman had other alternatives 
that were available to him, which he refused to consider.  
The same was true of his decision to drop the nuclear bomb.  
He had other alternatives that he could have explored in an 
effort to try and avoid such a devastating move against the 
civilian population of Japan, but he went ahead with the 
option to use the bomb in an effort to establish the upper 
hand in his diplomacy with the Soviet Union.   
As a professional politician who was supported by 
powerful big city bosses, his stance against communism, and 
his fear of Soviet desires to expand, kept him from 
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following the approach of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. 
that Roosevelt had taken and that others (like Wallace) 
believed should be used.  His approach of containment and 
uncompromising attack on the Soviet government and its 
principles never allowed an opportunity for a compromise 
between the two countries, even if the Soviets had desired 
one.  The decisions that Truman made during his first few 
years in office definitely helped create the Cold War 
between the two Super Powers and he used scare tactics on 
the American people to create the same paranoia in the U.S. 
that he had promoted in response to Soviet Communist 
expansionism. 
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